The Third Approach
This view of art is, of course, not possible without a theory, such as Jung's, that conceives of the mind as comprised of separate faculties or dimensions in NEED of integration. Of course the component parts
don't have to be identified in the way that Jung specifies. Nor must we, theoretically speaking, restrict ourselves to exactly FOUR key variables - there might be more, or less. But different aspects or 'sides' of experience will have to be distinguished if we are to make sense of the idea that an individual can be 'out of balance' in herself or himself.
Although the set of functions that Jung mentions is really only one VARIATION in the perennial search 27 for parameters according to which human diversity can be explicated, the Jungian system does provide a plausible option.
Given the fact that it is Jung's system that Read chose to work with, the
next question that we might conceivable ask is 'What constitutes the
INTEGRATION of the four functions?' This is, in its own right,
a complex and fascinating topic.
In administering various types of 'personality sorter', we have invariably
found, albeit in a relatively small percentage of individuals, persons who seem to want
Although one can find, in Jung and others, talk about the 'harmonizing' of the functions, it is not really an equality in degree of preference that is implied 28 - although preferences may at some point become more balanced as a result of harmonization.
The desirability of equally distributed preferences has indeed often been called into question. A prematurely struck balance is considered counterproductive by Jungians, and individuals are even encouraged (especially in the earlier stages of development) to 'specialize' in a particular function, as it were. Unless functions are developed they cannot be harmonized - and all that can be expected is a COMPROMISE of some sort -
a point to which we shall return later.
If not an 'equality of preferences', what then DOES integration mean? What contemporary Jungian analyst John Beebe 29 has to say on the matter is helpful. Pointing
out that the word has the same root as the word 'integrity', he comments on the fact that achieving integrity involves a 'dialectic' - in the traditional Hegelian sense of the word, in which a struggle between a 'thesis' and its opposing 'antithesis' resolves in a 'synthesis' that takes place at a higher level of description (Beebe, 20-21).
But in the individual's development what are the opposing poles which become reconciled via this type of process? In Jung's theory there were two pairs of functional opposites - Thinking and Feeling, on the one hand, and Sensing and Intuition on the other. The following passage from Beebe associates these with the dialectical processes that purportedly result in individual 'integrity'.
The importance of this passage, for us, resides in the manner in which
it emphasizes the truly profound nature of the integrative process for which, in the present paper, we seek a definition. For Beebe's comparison between East and West suggests how such an integration has remained, to date, a more or less unfinished process. It is a work-in-progress, as it were, with vast geographical regions of the globe having specialized in one or the other functional 'pair'. This suggest how difficult it indeed is to achieve a THOROUGH-GOING integration, involving all four of the functions.
Beebe's analysis is in keeping, of course, with Jung's claim that working with the functions involves raising those that are immersed in 'the unconscious' to a previously unattained level of awareness in the individual. Sometimes this is described as an 'integrating [of] the shadow'. (Beebe, 33)
'Only in the late work of great artists' - such as Yeats, according to Beebe - can we thus expect to find the individual entering into what Beebe
calls 'the grace of integritas.' (Beebe, page 68) This accomplishment will no doubt involve, as he mentions, 'an honest engagement of the entirety of the personality'. Or, in the words of Erick Erickson - a capacity to 'envisage human problems in their entirety' (Beebe, 126).
Erickson of course is referring to something like an ability to see the
problem from all points of view at once. From the perspective of Jungian personality type, this might conceivably mean seeing from the point of view of all four functional frames at once (as these are experienced, we might add, by individuals who have succeed in accomplishing the highest levels of development in their respective functions).
Could it be that at this point in time, historically speaking, we don't yet know what it would be like to see things with such eyes? Is it possible that we are still, as human beings, in the process of evolving toward such an accomplishment? Hegel long ago conceived of a world Spirit coming to know itself through an historical process of embodiment.
Would the 'supreme' being that may in this way finally revealed at the end
of such a process be, like Leibnitz's 'God', without PARTICULAR viewpoint? (see footnote 8).
If so, we may be getting a glimpse of the face of such a 'god'
in the paintings of the cubists, who sought to represent 'all viewpoints' simultaneously, as we shall see in About Face Again.
If something along the lines of this type of evolution is slowly taking place within us, how would we experience it? It stands to reason that we might
not at first be aware of it. And it would surely be outside of the control of our thought processes. The experiential 'space' that results from integrating the dimensions of experience into a higher order 'synthesis' would, in other words, at first be the product of an organization that is accomplished 'unconsciously'. And it would be experienced - if Herbert Read is right - through something akin to what he calls an 'aesthetic feeling'. It is this type of feeling (or, more accurately, level of feeling) that accompanies art, according to Read, when art is at its best, achieving for us a higher level or order of functional organization - the 'integration' that we are here exploring.
Read says,
This leads the artist to what Read calls 'the mysterious and divine labour of producing things according to his own feelings'. (Read, 113) Thus, according to Read, consciousness 30 is only integrated insofar as 'it is an aesthetic apprehension of reality', experienced as a very subtle and developed sort
of (aesthetic) feeling state. (Read, 193)
Until relatively recently, it used to be the case that the word education stood not for a mere ACCUMULATION of information or knowledge, but for something akin to the kind of higher order 'synthesis' that we are here exploring. So for Read it was only natural to see art - once it is viewed as the quintessential process leading to integration - as the foundation on which an educational system might be built.
Read maintains that art, a developed form of 'play', is 'an organic process of human evolution' (Read, page 14) and 'an attempt to revert from the disintegration induced by civilization to organic modes of being.' (82)
In 1972, thirty years after Read proposed this theory of art, Gregory Bateson would independently come up with a very similar theory of art. Bateson maintained that 'art is a part of man's quest for grace' (Bateson, 129)
and argues that -
The resemblence between this passage and Read's view hardly
needs comment. In both, art is an integration of diverse inner parts, and it involves not only the reconciliation of feeling ('reasons of the heart') and thinking ('reasons of reason'), but (we might add, in behalf of Bateson),
reconciliation of the two Jungian functions that he fails to mention. Also involved in Bateson's version is, like Read's, a reconciliation of the 'levels' of mind.
But what Bateson adds to Read's proposal is further articulation of what comprises these 'levels'. And this feature of Bateson's theory
sheds light on a very important aspect of the kind of integration
that we are here concerned with understanding - the manner in which
integration of this sort requires a recognition and acknowledgement
of contradiction and paradox - what Bateson called the 'double bind' 31.
'Play', which is for Bateson (like for Read) a rudimentary form of art,
involves a sophisticated form of communication which, by definition,
incorporates paradox -
Now, this phenomenon, play, could only occur if the participant
organisms were capable of some degree of meta-communication,
i.e., exchanging signals which would carry the message 'this
is play'. [And] this message contains those elements which
necessarily generate a paradox of the Russellian or
Epimenides type - a negative statement containing an
implicit negative metastatement. Expanded, the statement
'this is play' looks something like this: 'These actions in
which we now engage do not denote what those actions
FOR WHICH THEY STAND would denote. (Bateson, 179-180)
Extrapolating from Read's proposal, after understanding
the further elaborated that is receives from Bateson, we would
submit that for the individual to achieve a full synthesis of the four functions, and thereby an 'integrated' consciousness, it will be necessary for her to acknowledge and come to grips with its quintessentially paradoxical nature, especially as this structural peculiarity is manifest
in the opposition between mental 'functions'.
In any case, Read is led by HIS analysis into
a review of the literature on the educational possibilities of art,
which begins all the way back in 1857 with Ruskin. Cyril Burt's theory of the evolution of children's drawings (Read, 118) is mentioned, along with - the stages of development articulated by Dr. Ruth Griffith (1935) (Read, 120), Helga Eng's Psychology of Children's Drawings, Krotzsch's work on the development of kinesthetic imagination (Read, 126), and Luquet's (Read, 123) observation that 'not only does the [8 year old] child recognize that other people draw in a style different from his; not only does he expect such people to observe the same fidelity to their style as he does to his; but further, when he draws for another person, he adopts for that occasion the style of that person instead of his own...' (Read, 123) - which Read dubs a capacity for 'duplicity of style'. [For more on this, and a related technique in modern art, which we call 'twifoldry', see About Face Again]
But for us, in the context of this paper, it is Read's detailed discussion of the word 'schema' and its use in describing the stages in the child's artistic development that is most noteworthy. He defines that
word in the following way -
What we find intriguing is the presumption that schemas EVOLVE as the child matures - from a 'linear or one-dimensional schema' to an
outline or two-dimensional schema. (Read, 123) If this is so, is it not possible to predict three further stages in the development of the artist? - 1) one in which three-dimensional schemas will be explored (equivalent to the investigation of traditional visual 'perspective' in renaissance art); 2) one in which schemas having MORE than three dimensions are explored (a project that surfaced in art at the beginning of the 'modernist' movement, in the late nineteenth century); and 3) schemas in which complex non-linear or 'looped' relations between dimensions are explored (which were first investigated by such artists as Picasso, Escher, and others, in the early twentieth century)
It was the Modern artist who vividly demonstrated what it would be like to play with schemas that reach beyond the traditional approach
to 'perspective'. To their work we turn in About Face Again.
In this respect Krotzsch's work on kinesthetic imagination, also reviewed by Read, takes on new significance. Krotzsch gave a careful analysis of the development of purely kinaesthetic activity in drawing, describing
how the child spontaneously uses the musclulature to express innate bodily rhythms. In the words of Read,
Like Read, we would object that the developmental process need
not not end there, diverted as it were by recognition familiar
objects in the forms drawn. The circle and the spiral,
as we've elsewhere explained, seem to lead naturally to the appreciation of a special KIND of movement, one that may be less kinaesthetically oriented and more mental in nature - the systolic/diastolic movement of CONSCIOUSNESS, about which we wrote in our series on the mandala. We tried to show there that this movement can lead to a sort of 'turning inside out' of consciousness that is associated, by mystics, with 'enlightenment'. It is this kind of movement that strives to emerge
in us, as a species, in art and other naturally occuring 'primary process' activities (such as dreams, jokes, etc), and may be considered an important evolutionary step in the development of the human being.
Like Read, Kandinsky also spoke - in his treatise on art -
of 'organic form'. For him it is the type of form that most closely
approximates what we are calling 'integration'. It 'possesses ... an inner harmony of its own', which makes it the 'fundamental harmony of the WHOLE [emphasis ours]'. 32
In the late nineteenth and early 20th century, the notion of 'organic form' was indeed quite popular - especially with the Modern artist. Henri Bergson, a philosopher of that period, deserves a large part of the credit
for this. In a moment we shall turn our attention to the specifics
of what he had in mind. But first we want to establish the fact
that the notion of 'organic form' continued to remain an attractive
concept for artists well into the 20th century.
In 1957, in her book, Problems of
Art, 33 Suzanne Langer would say 'Another metaphor of the
studio, borrowed from the biological realm, is the familiar
statement that every art work must be organic' (Langer, 44). By the
mid-twentieth century this metaphor had become so deeply
embedded in the field of art that, as Langer points out, that
'most artists will not even agree with a literal-minded
critic that this is a metaphor.'
In a chapter on 'Living Form', (1957) she explores this metaphor
in detail. 'If art is, as I believe it is, the expression of human
consciousness in a single metaphorical image, that image must
somehow achieve the semblance of living form'. (Langer, 53)
She finishes her chapter on this subject with the following
words:
The echo of Bergson's words can also be heard in the work of the
'systems theorists' of the mid-20th century, who sought to describe a more organic relationship between 'part' and 'whole'.
Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was a French philosopher who proposed a theory of evolution grounded in biology. He was interested in coming to grips with the difference between the physical and biological sciences was
not easily reconciled.
Bergson (1911) was the first to argue that what might at first look
like 'disorder' may in fact be another KIND of order. 34
'I posit two kinds of order' 35, said Bergson, 'each the inverse of the other, [and] I perceive that no intermediate degrees can be imagined between the two orders...' (Bergson, 236) The two orders are not organized into a linear heirarchy, in other words, or a graduated spectrum in which one is on the top, the other beneath it, and absolute 'disorder' constituting a third alternative, at the very bottom of the heirarchy - 'one nature in graded powers', to use Plotinus's words. Instead, the 'absence of one of the two orders,' Bergson maintains, 'consists in the presence of the other'. (Bergson, 233) One can think of no better way to illustrate the relationship between them than by way of Yeats's 'interpenetrating cones', which VISUALLY describe realities of inverse order. [The 'Enneagram of Process' can also be used to illustrate the 'interpenetration' of incommensurable orders, as we've shown in Taking (Hyper)Action in Lucid Dreams - the 'Enneagram of Paradigm Shifting' and the 'Enneagram of Self and Ego']
About these two 'orders' it can be said, according to Bergson, 'I enter neither into one nor into the other nor into both at once, although both, united, may give a fair imitation of the mutual interpenetration and continuity that I find at the base of my own self. Such is my inner
life, and such also is life in general.' (Bergson, 258)
These orders are mutually exclusive and inversely proportional. The 'interruption' of one order is what is responsible for progress made within the rival order. [The section of our paper on paradigms]. Although such
an 'interruption' may at first APPEAR as disorder, it is only relative disorder. It is actually order, but order of a different,
incommensurable kind. The alternate 'order' is one that is concerned with a movement that is 'the inverse of its own' (Bergson, 251).
There are, accordingly, radically different forms of 'organization' associated with each order - one of which takes the form of 'parts entirely external to other parts in space and in time'. The other, which he calls 'organic' or 'vital', takes the form of a unit which is split up into 'partial views'. 36
We must see the movement that occurs in all vital activity as a 'direct movement' that is folded into or 'subsists' in 'the inverted movement'.
So, at one and the same time, there is a 'reality which is making itself IN a reality which is unmaking itself', in his words. As a result of the fact that we are immersed in both orders simultaneously, every action will be a 'creative action which is [also] unmaking itself'. (Bergson, 248)
Interestingly, Bergson asks what the principle is whereby the 'interruption of the cause' of one order of existence creates 'a reversal of effect' that
propels us into the alternate order. And he answers his own question in this way: 'For want of a better word we have called it consciousness.' (Bergson, 237) The two inversely related, interpenetrating orders are, in other words, a feature of consciousness.
Furthermore, an 'interruption' can occur in two ways - one of which seems to be related to the S-N axis, the other to the T-F axis: 1) When 'the CREATIVE current is momentarily interrupted, ... there is a creation of MATTER'. Here Bergson comes close to identifying the enantiodromic relationship that obtains between Sensing and iNtuition; and 2) INDIVIDUATION can be interrupted in the service of ASSOCIATION, and vice versa. Here he comes close to identifying the second enantiodromically related pair - Thinking (which is intimately related to individual 'will') and Feeling (which is related to the social dimension).
It is interesting that Read, using a similar approach, identifies two similar paradoxes, each of which also requires 'integration'. He speaks of a 'reconciliation of individual uniqueness with social unity', which involves reconciling 'feeling'and 'thinking' (page 5), and also talks about
a reconciliation of the 'concrete' image with the 'symbolic' or
abstract, which is the province of 'imagination'.
About the first antinomy Bergson says,
The continual movement between the two poles is, according to Bergson, the product of the tension that is created by the 'interpenetration' of the two orders. 'The evolution of life in the double direction of individuality and association has therefore nothing accidental about it; it is due to the very nature of life.' Furthermore, 'If our analysis is right,' he continues,
'it is consciousness ... that is at the origin of life.' (Bergson, 261)
The poet W.B. Yeats, provides us with some handy diagrams
that illustrate the relationship of the 'interpenetration', 'inversion',
and 'interruption' that is verbally described by Bergson. So we turn
now to him.
Below, to the left, is a diagram of the 'fundamental symbol' in the system that was passed down to Yeats from the 'communicators' who presumably spoke to his wife during their automatic writing sessions. The two cones in the diagram are meant to represent 'gyres' or 'whirls', as he calls them - what we would now call 'vortices'. He also diagrams them as three-dimensional spirals. One cone is inverted with respect to the other, and they interpenetrate. The 'apex of each vortex [is] in the other's base', he says, so as one cone 'increases' in diameter, the other 'decreases' - and hence the two cones can be thought of as being 'inversions', or in
Yeat's three-dimensional figure is also reminiscent of the t'ai-gi-tu - the yin-yang symbol. And that is not surprising, as it is inverse reciprocal relationships that he is trying to illustrate in the figure. In his discussion of this symbol, although Yeats does not mention the yin-yang symbol, he does quote Heraclitus's phrase: 'Dying each other's life, living each other's death'. In Psychological Types Jung would present the same quotation in his explanation of the concept of 'enantiodromia', a term which he borrowed from Heraclitus, as we mentioned in the sub-section entitled Understanding 'Enantiodromia' in terms of Limincentric Organization in the Conclusion to our Mandala series.
Having become interested in these figures as a result of the automatic writing, Yeats tried to research them. But nowhere could he
find either 'the geometrical symbolism nor anything that could have inspired it except the vortex of Empedocles' (Yeats, 20). He does make mention,
however, of the following -
Yeats also mentions Flaubert -
Elsewhere Yeats calls the two cones 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity', which he describes as 'intersecting states struggling one against the other' (71). He recognizes them as 'antithetical', in the Hegelian sense, or 'contraries' - which he defines, citing Blake, as opposites that can be equally true (ie, PARADOXICAL) (72).
The role that this diagram played for Yeats cannot be overestimated.
The associated personality system that he created was 'based upon [this] single geometrical conception ...' (11) It had four 'faculties' (similar to what Jung would call 'functions') and 28 typical 'incarnations' (i.e., psychological 'types'), two of which had 'genuine' and 'false' expressions. In addition there were four 'principles' (22). The whole structure was founded on a paradox - or 'antinomy' - as Yeats called it, (page 52) which
has the purpose of affirming, as he puts it, 'that all the gains of man come from conflict with the opposite of his true being.' (13)
Yeats was, of course, not a scientist. He was a poet and storyteller.
So he would often revert, in explaining his 'system', to the creation
of fictional characters who would be relegated the task of doing
the explaining for him. 37 One such character visualizes the universe as 'a great egg that turns inside-out perpetually without breaking its shell' (33) - an image that is reminiscentof certain metaphors that we found handy in explaining the mandala.
The same character also gives a fictional account of how the personality system that Yeats was trying to articulate came into being. It may be
of interest to enneagram enthusiasts - since it resembles stories told about the early appearance of the enneagram:
Conscious purpose and autocratic governance are
anathema to the kind of artistic process that Read
and the others conceive as capable of accomplishing
the integration of functions.
The kind of work that is required to achieve integration
is subtle and, for the most part, 'unconscious' (in the sense of
outside of our explicit awareness). Under the constraints
imposed by autocratically structured environments the fragile
process is stimied, and over the course of time the 'unconscious'
atrophies - becoming the 'seething cauldron' of Freudian
psychology.
The logo does not, however, show the cones 'interpenetrating'. If the symbol were to have
This contraction of the organic fullness of life to a system of
alternative modes of action determined by one's own pleasure
and one's own pain is the source of our neurotic ills. ...
IT IS ONLY IN SO FAR AS GROUP ACTIVITIES TAKE ON THE AESTHETIC
PATTERNS AND ORGANIC VITALITY OF THE GROUPS SPONTANEOUSLY FORMED
BY CHILDREN THEMSELVES (AND BY ADULTS WHEN THEY ARE PLAYING LIKE
CHILDREN) THAT THESE ACTIVITIES WILL ACHIEVE A MORAL AND
INTELLECTUAL SUPERIORITY OVER MORE AUTHORITARIAN FORMS OF
EDUCATION." (Read's emphasis, page 283)
And only under these circumstances - where freedom and
reciprocity prevail - do art processes stand
a chance of succeeding in accomplishing the kind of integration
of the functions that it is capable of producing.
27. As Read himself points out:
In the same appendix, there is an interesting discussion of the concept
of 'factors' in personality theory in comparison to the older 'faculty'
psychology. Cyril Burt's exhaustive treatment of that subject, in
The Factors of the Mind had only recently been published.
28. Albert Hofstadter maintains that 'harmony' may ultimately
involve a 'synthesis' between language and thought, or
syntax (dictionary def: 'orderly or systematic arrangement
of parts or elements') and words (94). He also implies that
such a synthesis may, by definition, involve the kind of crossing
of contextual levels in which we have show particular interest.
We would put this a slightly different way - the 'synthesis' in
which 'harmony' is established may, in other words, depend on the synthesizer's ability to back up far enough from functional
contradictions to see them as 'paradoxes' - i.e., to NOTICE that
the 'whole' that these parts suggest is 'liminocentric' and will
thus necessarily OFFEND logic by incorporating into itself a crossing
of contextual levels. More about this further on in this paper.
29. John Beebe, Integrity in Depth, 1992, (Texas: Texas A&M University
Press).
Although Herbert Read often spoke of consciousness in a way
that suggests he held a 'spotlight model', some of his descriptions
anticipate certain points that C.O Evans [and Fudjack] would later make.
Read saw that not only should that which is 'discriminated'
by the subject's acts of attention (which bring certain objects into
focal awareness) be included in a description of conscious experience,
the 'context' that invariably accompanies such objects must also
be mentioned:
Read also recognized that accompanying the discrimination of the 'object' is an awareness of the 'whole situation' in which the object is embedded,
and that that awareness is experienced vis a vis 'feeling':
31.
Gregory Bateson (1904-1980) was, of course, the one who introduced the concept of the 'double bind', in 1959, after having observed and studied Milton Erickson's approach to hynotherapy. He also coined the term 'transcontextual' as a general term for the genus of syndromes in which the double bind is one species. [Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind,
1972, (New York: Ballantive Books, page 272].
Transcontextual process is a special KIND of process associated with what we would call 'liminocentric' structure - a process in which there is a mixing
or crossing of contextual levels. Our idea of liminocentric
structuring owes everything to Bateson's concept of the 'double bind'.
Stated simply, in the words of Bateson's original paper on the
subject, the idea behind the notion of the 'double bind' is
that '... what occurs within the narrow context will be
affected by the wider context within which this smaller one has its
being.' There may, furthermore, 'be incongruence or conflict between context
and metacontext.'
A classic instance of the double bind is when one person
says to another, 'I love you', but says it in a way that
subtly meta-communicates, 'Do not believe what I say'. When the
individual is not permitted to back far enough away from
such an interaction to see the contradiction between message
and meta-message, a double bind is experienced. The double binded
person will experience confusion, distress and psychological
paralysis.
There are also 'beneficial' double binds (which later came to be
called 'win-win' situations) -in which, no matter WHAT one does, one succeeds. When one experiences the 'unconditional regard' that is prescribed by Carl Rogers as the proper therapeutic attitude for a therapist to exhibit in working with a client one is experiencing a beneficial
double bind.
Formally stated, the negative double bind involves a contradictory
injuction (both 'do A' and 'do not-A') accompanied by a
third injuction ('you are not permitted to acknowledge
the contradiction').
The double bind can have a very similar effect to
the effect one feels when experiencing a paradox.
Take Epimenides's famous example, the
the socalled 'liar's paradox' - which manifests in the
sentence, 'This sentence is a lie'. If the sentence is true,
it must be false. But if the sentence is false, and
it is not a lie, then the sentence must be true. So
when the sentence is true, it must be false; and when it
is false, it must be true. One goes round and round,
forever. Very confusing, and distressing, if one
takes the matter seriously - which one MUST do if
one is restrained, by the third injuction, from
stepping out of the contradiction.
The philosopher and mathematician, Bertrand Russell,
tried to offer a solution to the paradox by proclaiming
that a mathematical 'set' cannot be a member of itself.
Logic, according to Russell, does not 'permit' such
a move, which he calls a 'category mistake'. Russell is correct in
having identified what is at fault with such paradoxes, but
his solution begs the question. Why cannot a set be a member
of itself?
For Bateson, 'integration' involves TRANSCENDING the
'levels' that stand in contradiction to each other,
in a way that is not dissimilar to what Russell had in mind.
But is this always possible? For if we are right,
and consciousness is liminocentrically structured,
this will mean that reality is, at a fundamental
level of description, paradoxical.
We submit that Bateson did not go far enough -
he did not explicitly conceive of these 'binds'
as STRUCTURES. More importantly -
crucial in fact - he did not recognize that
these peculiar structures that he was studying
could NOT be exorcized, or avoided.
This does not detract from his basic points
regarding the double bind. And the question about
whether these structures are ultimately detrimental
or beneficial actually depends upon the extent to which
they are 'made conscious' by the individual - the extent
to which the individual comes to grips with the experience
of liminocentrically experienced reality.
To the extent that he or she has, incommensurable 'orders'
will be rendered capable of reconciliation -
by only by acknowledging and integrating 'paradox',
making it a central feature of experience.
32. Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 1911, page 31.
'To harmonize the whole is the task of art,' says Kandinsky (page 3).
But what was sought was not just a 'mechanical' harmony, but something 'organic'. He seems to delight in telling the following
related story in his above-mentioned book on art:
33. Suzanne Langer, The Problems of Art, 1957 (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons.
34. In the 1990s, approximately 80 years after Bergson's Creative Evolution, sociologist of art Robert Witkin would make a similar point:
35. Of the two types of order, the former is associated with 'intellect', the latter with 'intuition' - a move. (Bergson, 1911, page 250.) In the
same year, Jung would similarly distinguish 'two types of thought'
('directed' or 'logical' thinking, on the one hand, and 'symbolic'
thinking on the other), a distinction out of which his entire personality system would eventually emerge. This was also the year that marked the beginning of the end for the relationship between Freud and Jung.
36. Aesthetician Jacques Maritain would make a similar point
in 1953:
And what if the 'whole' which precedes the parts
is liminocentric - paradoxically structured, so that the parts
can in some sense be said to INCLUDE the whole?
Then 'integration' will consist in coming to realize HOW
this is so. When that happens, a 'synthesis' of the parts
is achieved.
Yeats also admitted that 'Much that has happened, much that has been said, suggests that the communicators are the personalities of a dream shared by my wife, by myself, and occasionally by others ...' (22-23).
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diametrical 'opposition' to each other. This is very similar to the
figure we arrived at in our 
the simple cross that Jung used to diagram the relationship between the four functions. But why are cones used in the logo? See the section on 
incorporated that aspect of the relationship between the functions, it would have been much more complex, the 'schematic' equivalent of a figure like the one illustrated to the left, which is used in '
Is it possible that the Modern artist intended to explore spaces of this sort? To the left is a painting by one such artist, 